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Abstract
We study a microprocessor company selling short-life-cycle products to a set of buyers that
includes large consumer electronic goods manufacturers. The seller has a limited capacity for
each product and negotiates with each buyer for the price. Our analysis of their sales data
reveals that larger purchases do not always result in bigger discounts. Instead, the discount
curve is like an ”N”. While existing theories cannot explain this non-monotonic pattern, we
develop an analytical model and show that the non-monotonicity is rooted in how sellers value
capacity when negotiating with a buyer. Large buyers accelerate the selling process and small
buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity. However, satisfying mid-sized buyers may
be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity,
which is often too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers. We briefly discuss the
implications for capacity rationing and posted pricing as well as potential applications to other
industries.
[Keywords: Data-driven; revenue management; pattern analysis; bargaining; semiconductor]
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1 Introduction
While conventional wisdom suggests that larger purchase quantities are generally associated with
lower prices (e.g., Spence 1977, Oren et al. 1982, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, and Weng 1995), our
empirical observations raise doubts. We interacted with managers of a large semiconductor company
and obtained a sales data set that spans a three-year period. In this data, we found several instances
wherein larger-quantity buyers pay higher prices. Five such examples are illustrated in Table 1.
Buyers were sorted into three groups—small, medium, and large—according to their total purchase
quantities. Interestingly, the average price received by the medium-quantity group is less than the
prices obtained by the other two groups; moreover, the large-quantity group received the highest
average price in four of the five examples. The data set had many such instances in which larger
buyers paid higher prices. In particular, if we rank buyers of a product according to their total
purchase quantities, we find that in about 26% of the cases, a buyer paid a higher average price than
a neighboring, smaller-quantity buyer. These observations point to non-monotonic price patterns.
Our task was threefold in this research. First, we empirically tested whether a non-monotonic
price-quantity relation generally exists. Second, we explored theoretical explanations for this phe-
nomenon and finally, we determined the managerial implications that flow from such a pricing
pattern. In the first step, we used a set of linear and nonlinear regressions to control for other pos-
sible influences on product price and found that the discount received by a buyer is statistically a
non-monotonic function of the buyer’s demand share (or relative size) for the product. Specifically,
the discount increases with demand share for small quantities; however, as demand share increases,
Table 1: Quantity-Weighted Average Price for Three Customer Segments
Product Category
Number of
Customers
Lifespan
(year)
Small Amt.
Avg. Price
Medium Amt.
Avg. Price
Large Amt.
Avg. Price
1
Desktop
CPU
40 2.77 $ 58.38 $ 55.32 $ 58.78
2
Desktop
CPU
5 0.98 $ 29.13 $ 27.45 $ 45.01
3
Desktop
CPU
6 0.90 $ 27.54 $ 25.33 $ 28.46
4
Desktop
CPU
11 0.86 $ 92.50 $ 91.06 $ 93.43
5 Memory 9 0.87 $ 2.59 $ 2.47 $ 2.51
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the discount decreases and then increases again. In brief, we observed an N-shaped discount curve,
which cannot be explained by the existing literature.
In the second step, we developed an analytical model based on the practices of the focal company
for which the product life cycle is short, capacity is inflexible, and prices are set through one-shot
negotiations. We showed that our model fits the data and can yield the price-quantity curves
found in the data. Our model suggests that the non-monotonic price-quantity relation is rooted
in how the seller values her capacity when negotiating with a buyer. Large buyers accelerate the
selling process and small buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity. However, satisfying
mid-sized buyers may be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the
remaining capacity, which may be too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers.
Therefore, mid-sized buyers are charged a “premium.”
Several managerial insights flow from our analytical model. Basically, given that each trans-
action has an impact on subsequent transactions, a good model of the price-quantity relation is
necessary for the optimization of the trade-off between the profit from the current buyer and that
of future buyers. Our analysis shows that it is important for the seller to control the capacity
allocated to each buyer prior to price negotiations, if possible. Our model can also help the seller
optimize the posted price, which balances the profit between buyers who take the price and buyers
who choose to bargain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present a brief literature review in Section
2. In Section 3, we introduce the industry and firm practices. In Section 4, we show our empirical
observation through linear and nonlinear regressions. We then build a model in Section 5 and
analyze the problem in Section 6. We discuss the managerial implications of our findings in Section
7 and conclude in Section 8. All of the proofs are in the electronic companion.1
2 Related Literature
Our work is related to four areas of research, the first of which concerns quantity-discount policies.
In the operations manangement and marketing literature, quantity-discount models have been
widely studied (e.g., Spence 1977 and Oren et al. 1982, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, and Weng
1The e-companion is available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0ByHSOpfhKdCQdTdkNUZ1NVV2Mlk/.
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1995). In this research stream, it is assumed that one party will offer a contract in a take-it-or-
leave-it fashion and buyers with greater demand receive lower prices. Assuming that one party has
full bargaining power simplifies the analysis, but it also ignores prevailing practices in which buyers
negotiate.
The second related area is B2B price bargaining. Kahli and Park (1989) analyzed a two-party
bargaining problem that is based on a economic order quantity (EOQ) model and showed that the
optimal discount increases with purchase quantity. Snyder (1998) and Chipty and Snyder (1999)
discussed the impact of buyer-demand size on price discount. Snyder (1998) showed that when
many suppliers compete to sell to one buyer, the price offered to the seller in equilibrium initially
increases with buyer size and then decreases with buyer size. However, the result requires that
suppliers cooperate and buyers appear sequentially over an infinite horizon, which are both very
strong assumptions in supply chains. Chipty and Snyder (1999) showed that a merger enhances
(worsens) a buyer’s bargaining position if the supplier’s payoff function is concave (convex) in total
transaction size. Our data exhibits a more complicated price pattern than what are predicted by
these models.
Other studies on B2B bargaining have assumed a given size of the pie and explored how the pie
is allocated among channel members. While Dukes et al. (2006) and Lovejoy (2010) focused on the
impact of channel structure, Nagarajan and Bassok (2008) considered suppliers in an assembly chain
who form multilateral bargaining coalitions and compete for a position in the bargaining sequence.
We supplement this branch of literature by considering a seller who sequentially negotiates with a
group of buyers and we investigate the impact of a buyer’s purchase quantity on the discount.
Our research is also related to revenue management. Kuo et al. (2011) first studied revenue
management for limited inventories when buyers negotiate and considered a dynamic setting with
fixed compositions of price-takers and bargainers with the assumption that each buyer only buys
one unit of the product and the posted price is updated frequently. The authors characterized the
optimal posted price and the resulting negotiation outcome as a function of inventory and time,
and showed that negotiation is an effective tool to achieve price discrimination. In contrast, our
paper considers a dynamic, capacity-rationing problem in a B2B market in which buyers request
different quantities and quantities influence prices.
Our work is closely related to research on dynamic and stochastic knapsack problems that study
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optimal admission or pricing policies when capacity is limited. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) cate-
gorize these type of problems as revenue management with group arrivals. While early studies such
as Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) and Kleywegt and Papastavrou (1998) showed that the optimal
expected revenue is concave in capacity if each buyer requires the same amount, Kleywegt and
Papastavrou (2001) showed that concavity does not hold in general when demands are heteroge-
neous. Kleywegt and Papastavrou (2001) focused on characterizing the conditions under which
concavity holds, and we focus on characterizing the property of the value function under which the
price-quantity relation is non-monotonic.
Lastly, our research is related to capacity management in the semiconductor industry. Wu et
al. (2005) provided a good review of this literature. Karabuk and Wu (2003) studied strategic
capacity planning in the presence of demand and capacity uncertainties. Cohen et al. (2003)
proposed a model to estimate the imputed costs of an equipment supplier. Terwiesch et al. (2005)
empirically studied the demand forecast sharing process between a buyer and a set of equipment
suppliers. Karabuk and Wu (2005) studied incentive issues when product managers compete for
capacity. Peng et al. (2012) worked with Intel and developed an equipment procurement framework
that allowed Intel to make a combination of base and flexible capacity reservations with suppliers.
Different from all of these studies, the current paper helps semiconductor companies understand
the value of their capacities when customers arrive sequentially and differ in order quantities.
To summarize, our paper makes the following contributions. First, we provide an empirical
analysis that reveals the existence of a non-monotonic price-quantity relation in the semiconductor
industry. Second, we develop a model to investigate this phenomenon and find a plausible ex-
planation. Third, we show a simple and sufficient condition for the price-quantity relation to be
non-monotonic.
3 Industry and Firm Practices
Market Structure. The microprocessor market is intensely competitive, with rapid technological
advancements, short product life cycles, and frequent pricing activities. Many competing sellers
such as Intel, Nvidia, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) sell multiple product lines primarily to
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), such as Hewlett-Packard (HP), Lenovo, and Dell.
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Capacity Inflexibility. For sellers to remain competitive, they need production capacity with
up-to-date process technology, which requires heavy capital investments. Some sellers such as
Intel manufacture products in-house, while others such as AMD only focus on product design
and outsource production to third-party foundries. In both cases, because manufacturing facilities
are costly and construction lead times are long, capacities are inflexible during a selling season.
Although capacity configuration at a manufacturing facility can be altered, doing so disrupts flows
in the manufacturing facility and causes increased manufacturing cycle times (Karabuk and Wu
2003). A common practice in this industry is for sellers to allocate capacity to product lines based
on demand forecasts and start production several month before demand is realized. The forecasts
represent sales commitments from product line managers and sometimes (non-binding) purchase
commitments from customers. Once the capacity is allocated to a product, production starts almost
immediately. In this way, sellers can first increase capacity utilization. Second, due to the long
production lead time, which is on average six to twelve weeks, sellers can build up inventory in
advance in order to satisfy customers that normally require immediate delivery. Last but not least,
semiconductor manufacturing entails significant learning and it takes time for yield to ramp up and
for quality to improve. Thus, when facing a supply shortage, it is not only costly but also risky for
sellers to seek an alternative source. Given these facts, it is important for sellers’ product managers
to provide accurate forecasts and sell according to allocated capacities.
Price Negotiation. Although each product has a posted price, the final price for each buyer is
usually set through negotiations. Major buyers are sophisticated, drive hard bargains, and often
enjoy higher annual revenues than sellers (Cooper 2008). Buyers know that the marginal production
cost of microprocessors is low and that sellers are eager to discount prices to fully utilize their
capacities. Moreover, buyers can allocate their business among competing sellers. Lacking full
pricing power, sellers are unable to use pricing strategies, such as take-it-or-leave-it price schedules
or a menu of contracts, and have to engage in negotiations. Once a price is settled, the contract
duration can vary for different buyers and products; price renegotiations happen frequently but not
in all cases.2 In our data set, approximately 45% of the purchases did not involve any renegotiation.
2Companies may use different types of contracts in terms of price flexibility that differ in terms of how frequently
and to what extent prices are renegotiated. Price renegotiation happens when a contracted price expires.
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Procurement Quantity. The purchase quantity is not normally a term for negotiation. In
principle, although buyers can allocate their requirements among alternative semiconductor firms,
they do so at a very early stage in the planning process because products offered by different
sellers differ in technical features and influence the design of the buyer’s products.3 In addition,
sellers’ brand images may matter in buyers’ markets. To produce their products, buyers need
many different inputs, and the composition of the inputs are interdependent. As a result, buyers’
procurement managers prefer to stick to their internal production plans and procure the desired
quantity at the best possible price. In summary, buyers determine their purchase quantities based
on production plans prior to negotiating with suppliers and incur costs if they are unable to procure
these amounts and must switch to an alternative seller. Contracts, however, do not stipulate any
purchase commitments from the buyers.
Technology Upgrades. In this industry, the risk of obsolescence is a constant. Sellers are aware
that technological advancements can cause a rapid decline in demand for existing products. Al-
though they are aware of development cycles in the industry and can anticipate when rivals will
introduce products, sellers must consider the likelihood of a demand shock and the possibility of
having to salvage inventories (Karabuk and Wu 2003).
4 Empirical Observation and Analysis
The data provided by a major global semiconductor company for use in this study encompasses
sales of 3,826 products to 251 buyers over a three-year period. Each record in the data set consists
of customer ID, product ID, product category, product brand (subcategory), sales territory, bill
quantity, bill value in USD, unit price, and date of transaction. Products sold include central
processing units (CPUs), graphics processing units (GPUs), and embedded chips, among others.
3For example, Apple Inc. allocated about one-third of the A9 processor orders to the Taiwan Semiconductor Man-
ufacturing Company in April 2015, but the production of 2015 iPhones and iPads that use the A9 processor was not
started until August. Sources: http://appleinsider.com/articles/15/04/15/apple-makes-last-minute-decision-to-use-
tsmc-for-30-of-a9-chip-orders-for-next-iphone/; http://www.macrumors.com/2015/08/07/iphone-6s-production-late-
august/.
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4.1 Data Preparation
4.1.1 Fixed-Price Contracts
As buyer normally purchase a product through multiple transactions over time, the prices may be
renegotiated. In this paper, however, we focus on purchases in which prices are fixed over the entire
product life cycle. We say that such transactions are made under fixed-price contracts. The analysis
for fixed-price contracts or one-shot price bargaining is simpler than for repeated negotiations.
Let I and J be the indices of buyer and product, respectively. Let Tij be the set of dates at
which buyer i purchased product j. Let qijt and pijt denote the transaction quantity and price for
customer i and product j at time t ∈ Tij . We define an instance θij as the set of transactions related
to buyer i ∈ I and product j ∈ J ; i.e., θij := {(t, qijt, pijt) : t ∈ Tij}. For fixed-price contracts, we
have pijt = pij for all t ∈ Tij . As previously stated, in this industry it is a common practice for a
buyer to enter a price negotiation with a pre-determined target quantity. The life-cycle purchase
quantity is the target. Hence, we focus on the relationship between the total purchase quantity,
TQij =
∑
t∈Tij qijt, and the fixed price pij .
4.1.2 Normalization
Widely varying prices and market sizes for different products compel us to normalize the data.
Prices of the 425 brands (or product subcategories) range from several dollars to more than $100
per unit. In place of the price and total quantity, we use two ratio metrics: (1) effective discount
(ED) and (2) demand share (DS ). Define
EDij := 1− pij/ max
i′∈I,t∈T
pi′jt; (1)
DSij := TQij/
∑
i′∈I
TQi′j , (2)
where T := ∪Tij . Both variables have a range of [0, 1]. ED is a measure of price level relative to
the highest price ever paid for the product. It is important to note that, in the case of the seller
who provided us this data set, posted prices are very stable. As the vast majority of the posted
prices remain unchanged for more than a year, for a fixed-price contract the nominal discount
rate is almost constant over time and the ED is very close or equal to the nominal discount rate.
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Figure 1: Histograms for the Selected Subset of Fixed-Price Contracts
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The Fourth Root of Demand Share (r4ds)
DS is the ratio of the total quantity purchased by a buyer relative to the market size for that
product. The advantage of ED and DS is that they simultaneously control for the mean and
variation across different products.4 However, in the vast majority of instances, demand shares are
concentrated around zero (as shown in Figure 1 on the left) due to the 20–80 rule; i.e., 80% of
customers contribute only 20% of sales. Therefore, it is difficult to examine how quantity affects
price discount if we use DS. To circumvent this limitation, we use a power transformation of demand
share (PTDS ); i.e., PTDS = DSγ for a γ ∈ (0, 1). PTDS has serveral advantages. First, it is
a monotonic transformation of DS so the price-quantity relationship is preserved. Second, its
empirical distribution has a larger spread relative to DS (as shown in Figure 1 on the right) and
third, the range of [0, 1] is preserved. As shown in Table 2, the distribution has the highest spread
when γ is between 0.25 and 0.35, and γ = 0.25 yields a distribution that is the closest to normal in
this range.5 We focus on the fourth-root transformation (i.e., γ = 0.25). Later, to check robustness,
we consider the following values for γ: 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.35. Our objective is now reduced to
identifying the relationship between EDij and PTDSij while controlling for other factors.
4.1.3 Data Filtering
The data set corresponds to a three-year period from January 1, 2009 to March 25, 2012. Instances
that started prior to January 1, 2009 and those that lasted beyond March 25, 2012 have missing
4Note that the way a customer’s demand share evolves over time is irrelevant for our analysis. We only use the
ex-post demand share as a normalized quantity, which is constant over time.
5Note that our primary goal is to spread out the distribution as much as possible.
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Table 2: Measuring the Distributions of Power-Transformed Demand Share
DS0.15 DS0.20 DS0.25 DS0.30 DS0.35 DS0.40 DS0.45
St.Dev. 0.1409 0.1556 0.1624 0.1642 0.1626 0.1589 0.1539
W 0.9873 0.9743 0.9572 0.9365 0.9131 0.8875 0.8604
Note. The Shapiro-Wilk W statistic measures the straightness of the normal
probability plot of a variable; larger values of W indicate better normality.
data (or are truncated). Because prices in the microprocessor market decrease over time, instances
with left-truncation appear to have smaller total quantities and higher prices than subsequent
instances. Similarly, instances with right-truncation appear to have smaller total quantities and
lower prices than preceding instances. Mixing these two effects may generate a non-monotonic
relationship between price and quantity. To mitigate the effects of truncation, we only consider
instances with an observed starting date that is at least one quarter after January 1, 2009, and
an observed ending date that is at least one quarter earlier than March 25, 2012. There are
6,573 instances (about 53%) that satisfy these criteria. Furthermore, to focus on regular purchases
and not transactions for one-time substitutions or sample testing—that follow a different selling
process—we drop another 312 instances (about 4.7%) that have only one purchase record. Finally,
products that have an extremely small number of buyers are often customized and may follow a
different selling process. Such products also tend to have buyers with very high demand-shares
and narrow price dispersions and as a result, our proxies for these products’ posted prices could be
downward-biased. To avoid this bias, we drop another 1,551 instances (about 18%) and consider
only products that have more than three buyers. In this way, we obtain a subset of the data with
2,346 fixed-price instances and 2,364 price-renegotiated instances. In the electronic companion, we
use the Heckman selection model to correct for the selection bias and show that our data filtering
does not change the price-quantity pattern.
4.2 Variables
Aside from the demand share, other variables may also influence a customer’s discount. According
to the generalized Nash bargaining model (Nash 1950; Roth and Malouf 1979), these variables
fall into three broad categories: the seller’s outside options, the buyer’s outside options, and the
respective bargaining powers of both buyer and seller. As far as we can imagine, the seller’s outside
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Fixed-Price Instances (N = 2,346)
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max Variables Mean S.D. Min Max
ED .1126 .1781 0 .9986 lndod 3.9237 1.8581 0 6.9527
DS .0516 .0942 3.8e-6 .9263 lndrt 4.5246 1.3531 0 6.8977
DS0.25 .3818 .1624 .0440 .9811 M3 .2928 .4552 0 1
Cbase 19.66 13.43 4 48 CapL .4614 .3052 .1761 1.176
TSQ 8.37e5 2.35e6 826 3.06e7 Cshr .0516 .1038 2.24e-6 .7897
Herf .2593 .1787 .0561 .9815 Vrate .3112 .2506 0 .9375
options are affected by production cost, salvage value, buyer-side competition, time of purchase,
capacity or inventory level, and demand uncertainty. The buyer’s outside options are affected by the
value of adopting a different product, seller-side competition, posted price, and time of purchase.
Bargaining powers are affected by the value of the business relationship, the bargaining skills of
salespersons and procurement managers, and the buyer’s reputation for committing to a forecast.
In the following, we explain the variables included in our regression. Table 3 provides the summary
statistics, and Table 4 shows the correlation among the variables.
Power transformation of Demand Share. We first focus on the relationship between ED and
the fourth root of demand share (r4ds). Later, we will consider other power transformations of
demand share (e.g., DS0.15, DS0.2, DS0.3, and DS0.35) to check the robustness.
Cbase. This variable counts the total number of buyers for a product, and is thus a measure of
a product’s popularity and the buyer-side competition.
TSQ. The total sales quantity of a product. This variable also captures the popularity of a
product.
Herf. The Herfindahl Index for the demand structure of a product, which measures the degree
of demand concentration. It is the square root of the sum of the square of demand shares across
all the buyers of a product (Weinstock 1982).
lndod. Because, in general, effective prices (or price-performance ratios) in the semiconductor
industry decrease over time, the later a buyer arrives the greater the discount (relative to the
posted price) he may obtain. To capture this effect, we use the logarithm of days of delay, which
is calculated as the difference in the number of days between the starting date of an instance and
the first date that the product was ever purchased. In addition, lndod is also a measure of demand
uncertainty because uncertainty is resolved over time. Note that the introduction date of a product
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is unobserved, but the starting date of the first purchase is normally a good proxy.
lndrt. The discount may also be related to the rate of purchase. We control for this effect by
the logarithm of the duration of an instance. Duration of an instance is given by the number of
days between the first and the last date of that instance. We note parenthetically that the duration
of an instance in our data set is fairly short, with an average of 232 days.
M3. It is well known that the end-of-quarter effect has a bearing on bargaining. We introduce
M3 as a binary variable for an instance, with a value equal to 1 if the date of the first order is in
the third month of a quarter and 0 otherwise.
CapL. Although the remaining capacity at the time of price negotiation is a consideration for
both parties, we do not have information about the capacity level. We approximate the total
capacity by the total sales of a product divided by the semiconductor industry capacity-utilization
rate (about 85%).6 The capacity available for a specific buyer is then the difference between the total
capacity level and the cumulative contracted sales prior to this buyer. We use CapL =(available
capacity level)/(total sales) as a control variable.
Cshr. A buyer that accounts for a large portion of the seller’s business can have significant
bargaining power. To capture this aspect of the bargaining power we use the measure Cshr (cus-
tomer share). Cshr is 100 times the total quantity purchased by a buyer divided by the seller’s
total sales volume across all products during the time period being studied. It measures the value
of a buyer to the seller.7 Note that using the total purchase value as a control variable may induce
endogeneity as the value depends on the price discount.
Vrate. Since we use the highest price paid for a product as an approximation of the posted
price, small variations in the price of a product will result in low ED and thus we have to also
control for price variations. However, prices depend on discounts. To avoid this endogeneity,
we use the fraction of instance in which the price was renegotiated to measure a product’s price
variation. Buyers with renegotiable-price contracts are more likely to get the posted price at the
beginning and experience price variations that are larger than those with fixed-price contracts.
6http://www.semiconductors.org/industry statistics/industry statistics/, accessed March 2015. We obtain very
similar results if we use random utilization rates (e.g., a normally distributed random variable with mean 0.85 and
standard deviation 0.1, capped by 0 and 1).
7Note that Cshr is a ex-post measure and it may not accurately capture a buyer’s bargaining power at the beginning
of the observed period. However, as we can see later, Cshr is highly collinear with the buyer fixed effects, indicating
that the bargaining power dynamics do not change drastically.
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix for the Selected Fixed-Price Instances
ED r4ds Cbase TSQ Herf lndod lndrt M3 CapL Cshr Vrate
ED 1.00
r4ds 0.06 1.00
Cbase -0.22 -0.42 1.00
TSQ 0.02 -0.15 0.10 1.00
Herf 0.15 0.07 -0.63 -0.09 1.00
lndod 0.30 -0.13 -0.22 0.07 0.24 1.00
lndrt -0.16 0.14 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.11 1.00
M3 0.03 0.08 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.09 1.00
CapL -0.16 0.38 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.65 0.12 -0.00 1.00
Cshr 0.22 0.29 -0.32 -0.01 0.20 -0.02 0.10 0.05 0.13 1.00
Vrate 0.36 -0.18 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.24 -0.13 0.01 -0.21 0.05 1.00
In addition, Vrate measures the uncertainty of the product’s value, because price renegotiations
normally happen when uncertainties are resolved. For fixed-price contracts, discounts are likely to
be larger when uncertainties are higher.
Product-line (or brand) fixed effect. To capture product-line-specific impacts such as seller-side
competition, production costs, and salvage values, we use binary variables for the 16 major brands
that have at least 100 observed instances in the original data set. It is also important to note
that the seller’s salespeople are organized by product lines. Thus, the impact of a salesperson’s
bargaining ability is product-line-specific and can be captured by the product-line fixed effect.
Buyer fixed effect. A buyer’s bargaining power is also affected by unobservable factors, such as
the experience of the procurement manager and the reputation for honoring a commitment. Hence,
we use binary variables to control buyer fixed effects for the ten major buyers ranked on the basis
of total purchase value. The remaining buyers serve as a reference.
Quarter fixed effect. To capture the industry dynamics that are cyclical within a financial year,
we use the first quarter as the reference and binary variables for the other three quarters.
Location fixed effect. The degree of market competition on both the buyer and seller sides may
depend on location. We use binary variables for nine of the ten recorded sales territories, such as
greater China and North America. Additionally, location may also be an indicator for cost and
demand uncertainty.
Interaction effect. The impact of capacity level may depend on elapsed time. The likelihood of
a technology shock increases over time and once a shock occurs, the seller may have to salvage the
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remaining capacity. Hence, the value of capacity may diminish as time elapses and we include the
interaction between CapL and lndod.
Although we include many variables, we still have the “omitted variable” problem. Consistent
estimators can be obtained only when the omitted variables are uncorrelated with our regressors.
The factors we do not control for are the net cost of switching to an alternative product and contract
terms other than price and quantity for a buyer. In the electronic companion, we show that under
certain mild assumptions the estimated coefficients are just the scaled true marginal effects when
these two factors are relevant but missing. Hence, the shape of the price-quantity relationship will
be preserved. Finally, note that we only consider instances with one-shot bargaining (or fixed-price
contract) for new products and as such, it is reasonable not to consider any reference effects from
previous discounts.
4.3 Regression Analysis
In this section, we explore the empirical relationship between the effective discount and demand
share in two steps. In the first step we partition the buyers into groups based on their demand
share and compute the average effective discount received by buyers in each segment. Based on the
observed pattern, in the second step we use piecewise polynomial regressions to fit a functional form.
Our analyses in these two steps are both necessary and complementary. The first step provides us
with information about the shape of the function, the possible location(s) of the knot(s), and the
order of polynomial functions. The second step allows us to test the statistical significance of the
functional form.
4.3.1 Average Discounts by Segments
For robustness, we consider two different segmentation approaches that are detailed are in Table
5. In model (i), we divide the instances into six segments according to r4ds. We use wider
ranges for the first and last segments in order to include more instances in the “tails.” In model
(ii), we use nine segments. Incorporating all our control variables, we run the linear regression
ED =
∑
k>1 ak · segk + b′X+  for each model, where segk is a binary indicator for segment k, X is
the vector of controlled covariates (including the constant), and  is the error term. The estimates
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Table 5: Summary Statistics and Regression Results for Demand Share Segments
Model Segmt.
Range Summary Stats. of r4ds Regression
of r4ds Mean S.D. Obs. Coef. Robust S.E. P value
(i)
1 0˜0.2 .1581 .0313 235 - - -
2 0.2˜0.35 .2772 .0423 916 .0141 .0097 0.149
3 0.35˜0.5 .4142 .0433 683 .0245 .0111 0.028
4 0.5˜0.65 .5669 .0406 335 .0428 .0153 0.005
5 0.65˜0.8 .7187 .0439 145 .0348 .0178 0.052
6 0.8˜1 .8625 .0459 32 .0933 .0312 0.003
(ii)
1 0˜0.15 .1226 .0199 85 - - -
2 0.15˜0.25 .2087 .0267 423 .0023 .0156 0.885
3 0.25˜0.35 .2993 .0289 643 .0031 .0159 0.843
4 0.35˜0.45 .3949 .0293 518 .0171 .0168 0.308
5 0.45˜0.55 .4965 .0286 291 .0145 .0183 0.429
6 0.55˜0.65 .5922 .0285 209 .0409 .0206 0.048
7 0.65˜0.75 .6977 .0303 106 .0194 .0230 0.398
8 0.75˜0.85 .7905 .0269 55 .0425 .0257 0.098
9 0.85˜1 .8987 .0374 16 .1223 .0476 0.010
for a are summarized in Table 5 and for b in Table 7.8
We can see that in both models the marginal impact of demand share on discount displays a
similar non-monotonic pattern. In model (i), the estimated coefficient increases with demand share
in the first four segments, then decreases in segment 5, and increases again in segment 6. In model
(ii), the coefficient increases until segment 6, then decreases in segment 7, and increases again.
These results indicate that the discount is likely to be an N-shaped function of demand share. In
Figure 2, we plot the average discount received by each segment and a smooth line connecting
them. In both graphs, all the other controlled variables take their mean values.
Although the smooth lines look like an “N” in both graphs of Figure 2, it is still difficult
to determine the statistical significance of this finding. What we can infer is that it may be
inappropriate to use a simple monotone function or a polynomial function. The discount curve
is more likely to be a combination of a monotonically increasing curve and a V-shaped curve.
Accordingly, in the next step, we fit a piecewise polynomial function and test the significance of
the non-monotonicity.
8We use the regress command with the robust option in Stata. With this option, Stata estimates the standard errors
using the Huber-White sandwich estimators. The robust standard errors can effectively deal with minor problems
regarding normality, heteroscedasticity, and some observations that exhibit large residuals. The point estimates of
the coefficients are exactly the same as those in an ordinary OLS.
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Figure 2: Average Marginal Impact of Demand Share in Model (i) and (ii)
Note. In both graphs, all other covariates take their mean values.
4.3.2 Piecewise Polynomial Regression
To reduce the number of parameters while maintaining adequate flexibility, we use a two-segment,
piecewise-quadratic function with an unknown knot to fit the data in model (iii).9 This allows us
to infer whether the function is linear or quadratic in each segment and where the two smooth lines
are connected. We let B denote the location of the knot and run a least-square regression with the
following nonlinear model:
ED = a1 · (r4ds−B)− + a2 · (r4ds−B)2− + a3 · (r4ds−B)+ + a4 · (r4ds−B)2+ + b′X + , (3)
where x− = min {x, 0}, x+ = max {x, 0}, X is the vector of controlled covariates (including the
constant), and  is the error term. We run this nonlinear-least-square (NLS) regression in Stata
with the command nl. The estimates are sensitive to initial values for the iteration performed by nl.
To minimize the reliance on initial guesses, we first run the NLS regression to estimate B and then
run an ordinary-least-square (OLS) regression using the estimated B to obtain other parameters.
We report the estimates for a1 to a4 and B in Table 6, and b in Table 7.
9A polynomial of degree three can also generate an N-shaped curve. However, a degree-three polynomial is concave
on the left of “N,” meaning that discount increases rapidly with demand share for very small buyers. According to
our empirical observation, the discount curve should be linear or convex first, so it is difficult to have a good fit for
a degree-three polynomial. Although polynomials of high degrees can approximate any shape of curve, they have
potential problems of overfitting and multicollinearity. In contrast, piecewise polynomials of lower degrees are capable
of offering adequate flexibility, while having fewer parameters.
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Table 6: Results of the Piecewise Polynomial Regressions
Model (iii) Model (iv)
Estimate Robust S.E. P value Estimate Robust S.E. P value
a1 0.2338 0.1058 0.027 0.1030 0.0319 0.001
a2 0.2981 0.2208 0.177 - - -
a3 -0.4378 0.2306 0.058 -0.3422 0.2001 0.087
a4 2.0449 0.8653 0.018 1.9251 0.9564 0.044
B 0.5668 0.0346 0.000 0.5794 0.0449 0.000
Model (v) Model (vi)
Estimate Robust S.E. P value Estimate Robust S.E. P value
a1 0.1857 0.1101 0.092 0.1355 0.0973 0.164
a2 0.2477 0.2805 0.377 0.0861 0.1726 0.618
a3 -0.1252 0.1759 0.477 -0.3958 0.3127 0.206
a4 0.7575 0.5609 0.177 2.6182 1.4140 0.064
B 0.5050 - - 0.6286 - -
We can see from Table 6 that a1 is significant (at the 5% level) but a2 is not, meaning that
a linear relationship is significant in the first (left) segment. In the second (right) segment, a3 is
significant at the 10% level (for the two-sided test) and a4 is significant at the 5% level, meaning
that a quadratic relationship is significant here. Because B = 0.5668 is highly significant (at the
0.1% level), the functional form cannot be described by a single linear or quadratic function. If
we assume in advance in model (iv) that the relationship is linear in the first (left) segment and
quadratic in the second (right) segment, we will get similar results. Note that the minimum of the
quadratic curve is achieved at r4ds = − a32a4 + B ≈ 0.1 + B > B, meaning that discount in the
second segment first decreases with demand share and then increases. To establish the significance
of non-monotonicity, we need to test the null hypothsis that a3 ≥ 0. For this one-sided test, we have
P values less than 5% for both model (iii) and (iv). Hence, we can now claim that the empirical
relationship between discount and demand share is indeed N-shaped.
To check the sensitivity of the estimated shape to the location of the knot, we run two linear
regressions based on model (iii) but with B = 0.5668 ± 2 × 0.0309. We call these two regressions
model (v) and (vi), respectively, and we plot the predicted average effective discount against r4ds
in Figure 3. Although setting a biased knot could smooth out the decreasing part of the curve, we
continue to observe N-shaped curves under both model (v) and (vi).
From this analysis we also find that the predicted discount decreases with the number of buyers
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Figure 3: Average Marginal Impact of Demand Share: Sensitivity to Knot Location
Notes. The lines show the predicted marginal effect of r4ds on ED , with other covariates taking their mean values.
Table 7: Summary of Regression Results
Variables
(i)
ED
(ii)
ED
(iii)
ED
(iv)
ED
(v)
ED
(vi)
ED
f(r4ds) Tab. 5 Tab. 5 Tab. 6 Tab. 6 Tab. 6 Tab. 6
Cbase -1.13e-3*** -1.21e-3*** -1.14e-3*** -1.15e-3*** -1.11e-3*** -1.16e-3***
(3.89e-4) (3.88e-4) (3.91e-4) (3.92e-4) (3.92e-4) (3.92e-4)
TSQ 8.41e-10 5.90e-10 6.42e-10 9.34e-10 7.33e-10 7.87e-10
(1.26e-9) (1.31e-9) (1.29e-9) (1.27e-9) (1.30e-9) (1.28e-09)
Herf -.0008 -.0059 -.0044 -.0053 .0005 -.0052
(.0271) (.0270) (.0271) (.0272) (.0272) (.0272)
lndod .0382*** .0382*** .0384*** .0385*** .0382*** .0384***
(.0047) (.0048) (.0047) (.0047) (.0047) (.0047)
lndrt -.0049 -.0049 -.0049 -.0051 -.0050 -.0051
(.0039) (.0040) (.0039) (.0039) (.0040) (.0040)
M3 -.0013 -.0007 -.0013 -.0014 -.0014 -.0014
(.0074) (.0074) (.0074) (.0074) (.0074) (.0074)
CapL .0873*** .0866*** .0855*** .0865*** .0846*** .0854***
(.0225) (.0225) (.0225) (.0224) (.0225) (.0225)
Cshr .2129 .2221 .1975 .2095 .2035 .2087
(.1718) (.1734) (.1726) (.1716) (.1720) (.1719)
Vrate .1931*** .1919*** .1936*** .1938*** .1942*** .1932***
(.0127) (.0127) (.0127) (.0127) (.0127) (.0127)
CapL*lndod -.0289*** -.0293*** -.0296*** -.0297*** -.0293*** -.0298***
(.0057) (.0058) (.0057) (.0057) (.0057) (.0057)
Constant -.1136*** -.0994*** -.0805*** -.0902*** -.0706** -.0588*
(.0329) (.0353) (.0346) (.0328) (.0323) (.0343)
F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.3817 0.3824 0.3835 0.3830 0.3820 0.3829
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. F.E.: Fixed Effect.
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for a product, increases with a buyer’s size,10 increases with the delays, and increases with the
remaining capacity level. Additionally, the interaction effect between elapsed time and capacity
level is negative. In other words, the impact of capacity level decreases over time, and the impact
of time delay decreases with capacity level. It is interesting to find that the effective discount is not
significantly correlated with the end-of-quarter effect and the demand concentration rate, which
may occur because fixed-price contracts entail long-term considerations and demand concentration
is not a good measure for product popularity.
4.4 Robustness Checks
To determine whether discount is influencing demand share simultaneously, we regress r4ds against
ED and other control variables using dummies for three quarters as instrumental variables. We
find no support for simultaneity. Next, we run four additional nonlinear-piecewise-polynomial
regressions using DS0.15, DS0.2, DS0.3, and DS0.35, respectively, in place of r4ds in (3), and we
obtain similar non-monotonic curves. Third, we find that omitting the buyer’s net cost of switching
and the value of other contract terms do not affect the non-monotonic pattern if certain mild
conditions hold. Lastly, we find that an “N” shape persists and is significant even after correcting
for sample selection biases. The details of the robustness checks are in the electronic companion.
4.5 Further Discussions
Our observations from the regressions analysis are particularly interesting because they are incon-
sistent with conventional wisdom as well as our intuition: we anticipated that buyers with larger
quantities would receive lower prices. While our intuition is correct for small- and large-quantity
buyers, we observe a discount valley for medium-sized buyers that cannot be fully explained by
existing theories. Why do we see such a discount curve? Although existing theories can predict in-
creasing or V-shaped discount curves, they work under very different premises and cannot account
for an “N” curve. Hence, we need models that shed light on price negotiations in B2B markets such
as the semiconductor industry and identify factors that give rise to the observed patterns.
Our empirical findings also have important implications for both buyers and sellers. Because
larger quantities may not always lead to lower prices, a buyer has to consider this possibility
10Cshr and buyer fixed effect are colinear and Cshr will be significant if buyer fixed effect is not included.
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while determining the purchase quantity. Despite this non-monotonic pricing pattern, arbitrage
opportunities do not necessarily exist for buyers, because empirically the total purchase cost still
increases with quantity.11 For the seller, this non-monotonic relationship may require paying careful
attention to posted prices and capacity allocated to different buyers. In the following sections we
develop an analytical model to explore the rationale behind our observations.
5 Modelling and Verification
To deepen our understanding, we develop a model for a single product and make the following key
assumptions. (i) The capacity is fixed and does not expire over time. (ii) Buyers arrive sequentially
and randomly. (iii) A technology shock will end the buyer arrival process. (iv) The seller can decide
the capacity allocation. (v) Prices are determined by Nash bargaining.
5.1 The Model
Consider a seller A (she) that sells a new product to a group of OEMs. A has κ units of a fixed
capacity. To be specific, we denote κ as the maximum amount of the product that can be produced
during the product life cycle. The current industry practice is that major microprocessor companies
produce according to their forecasts and start production as soon as the forecast is confirmed. Thus,
the capacity does not expire during the planned product life cycle. The selling starts at time 0 and
ends when no more buyers exist or the capacity is sold out. There are M potential buyers who
arrive according to a general, non-homogeneous Poisson arrival process. The arrival rate of the
i-th buyer after the arrival of the (i-1)-th buyer is λi < ∞ for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M . For simplicity, we
assume that the arrival process is only determined by market characteristics and is independent of
buyer identities or the history of the arrival process.
As previously stated, in the semiconductor industry, technological advancements of competing
products will lead to obsolescence. When such a technological shock happens, buyers that have
already adopted the product and integrated it into their product designs, will continue their planned
purchase. However, new buyers will cease to arrive and any unsold capacity will have to be salvaged.
We assume that the arrival time of the technological shock is exponentially distributed with rate
11We find that in only 7% of instances across the entire data set, a buyer pays less in total than another buyer of
the same product who buys less. This number is only 4% among fixed-price instances.
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λ0 and that seller A salvages the remaining capacity at a marginal value s when the shock arrives.
Let δi ∈ (0, 1) represents the probability of the shock arriving after the (i− 1)-th and prior to the
i-th buyer. We can check that δi =
λ0
λ0+λi
.
Let Di denote the total purchase requirement (or demand) of the i-th buyer and Qi the capacity
allocated to buyer i. We assume that buyers accept partial fulfillment as long as Qi ∈ [ηDi, Di],
where η ∈ (0, 1] is plausibly an industry standard that is exogenous and identical for all the buyers.
Hence, if η < 1, seller A faces a dynamic capacity-management problem wherein she must decide
the degree of fulfillment ρi for buyer i in order to maximize the total expected revenue. Let Ki be
the total available capacity when buyer i arrives, so Ki/Di is the maximum level of fulfillment and
ρi ∈ [η, 1] ∩ [0,Ki/Di]. Note that ρi is not relevant if Ki/Di < η.
Demand is unknown to the seller ex ante but is exogenously given. Each buyer’s production
plan is determined in advance as it is costly for buyer i to manipulate Di. Although demand may
not be exogenous from the buyer’s point of view, that is not a concern of this paper. From the
seller’s standpoint, demands can be correlated and the distribution of each new buyer’s demand can
be history-dependent. We define “history” as the set of information that is revealed to the seller.
Let ψ(t) denote the history up to time t, and ψi the history up to the arrival of buyer i. We assume
that Di follows distribution function (cdf) F (·|ψi−1), where ψ0 = Ø. For the purpose of analysis,
we make the following technical assumptions: (1) the expectation of the demand from a buyer is
always finite, and (2) there exists a lower envelope for the possible forms of F .
Technical Assumption 1.
´ +∞
0 DdF (D|ψ) <∞ for any ψ ∈ H, where H stands for the set of
all possible histories.
Technical Assumption 2. There exists an increasing and continuous function F0(·) such that
(i) F0(0) = 0, (ii) F0(+∞) = 1, and (iii) F0(x) ≤ F (x|ψ) for any x ∈ [0,+∞) and ψ ∈ H.
The sequence of events with the i-th buyer is modeled as follows. (1) Buyer i arrives at ti and
proposes an acceptable range [ηDi, Di] for his purchase quantity. (2) Seller A decides ρi. (3) Buyer
i stays if ρi ≥ η and leaves permenently otherwise. (4) If buyer i stays, they settle the transaction
price wi for quantity Qi = ρiDi through Nash bargaining, in which information is assumed to be
symmetric for simplicity.
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Let βi denote the exogenous, relative bargaining power of buyer i. It captures exogenous factors
such as bargaining skills and the net cost of maintaining a long-term relationship. We assume that
βi is known given the identity of buyer i. Conditional on history ψ, the bargaining power β of a
potential buyer follows distribution B (·|ψ). The generalized Nash bargaining model predicts that
if player j’s payoff and outside option for the focal transaction are Πj(w) and dj , respectively,
given the transaction price w, where j ∈ {A} ∪ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, then the bargaining results in price
w∗ = arg maxw (Πi(w)− di)βi · (ΠA(w)− dA)1−βi . In particular, if Πi(w) − di + ΠA(w) − dA is
independent of w, then w∗ splits the pie between the buyer and the seller in proportion to their
respective bargaining powers.
For buyer i, let ri and r
′
i denote the profit margins before subtracting the cost of the product
purchased from seller A and an alternative supplier, respectively, p the posted price for A’s product,
c˜i the marginal cost of buying from the alternative, Q
′
i the quantity available from the alternative,
and ρ′i the corresponding fill rate. In addition, let li =
Q′i
Qi
=
ρ′i·Di
ρi·Di =
ρ′i
ρi
. Accordingly, the total
payoff for buyer i is Πi(wi) = (ri − wi) ·Qi and the outside option is
di = max
{
Qi · (ri − p) , Q′i ·
(
r′i − c˜i
)}
=Qi ·max
{
ri − p, li ·
(
r′i − c˜i
)}
=Qi ·
[
ri −min
{
p, ri − li · r′i + li · c˜i
}]
. (4)
Let c¯i = ri − li · r′i + li · c˜i represent the net marginal cost of buying from the alternative supplier
in order to keep the same margin ri. If c¯i > p, it is not credible for buyer i to switch, so the
outside option is to buy from seller A at the posted price. This is possible because products are not
perfectly substitutable, and c¯i includes switching costs such as searching, redesigning, damage to
the brand image, and so on. We assume that c¯i is unknown to the seller ex ante but will be revealed
during the negotiation. For a potential customer who has not arrived, c¯ follows distribution G (·|ψ)
given history ψ. Regarding the link between li and Di or Qi, we can verify through simulations that
when η > 0.8, the correlations between li and Di and between li and Qi, respectively, are highly
insignificant and thus ∂li/∂Di ≈ 0 and ∂li/∂Qi ≈ 0.12 Hence, we make Assumption 3 to simplify
12Note that ρi may not be a monotonic function of Di given the complexity of the value function. According to our
interactions with practitioners, it is the industry standard to fill at least 90% of the requirement. Thus, the intuition
is that when η is close to 1, ρi could stick to a boundary or bounce back and forth between η and 1 as Di changes.
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Table 8: Summary of Notations
λi
Buyer arrival rate after
the (i− 1)-th buyer ρi Fill rate for buyer i β Bargaining power
λ0 Arrival rate of the tech shock η Lower bound of fill rate B Distribution of β
δn
Probability of tech shock
when n buyers have arrived
ti Arrival time of buyer i ΠA Seller’s payoff
s Marginal salvage value ψi History up to time ti Πi Buyer i’s payoff
κ The total capacity F Distribution of demand d Outside option
Ki Capacity available to buyer i c¯
Net marginal cost of buying
from an alternative supplier
p The posted price
Di Demand of buyer i G Distribution of c¯ w Transaction price
Qi Capacity allocated to buyer i cL Lower bound of c¯ V The value function
our analysis. Admittedly, when η is small this assumption may not hold and the price-quantity
relationship may become more complicated.
Technical Assumption 3. ∂li/∂Di = ∂li/∂Qi = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}.
For seller A, let V (K, p, ψ(t)) represent the expected revenue obtained after time t given re-
maining capacity K, posted price p, and history ψ(t). Therefore, when bargaining with buyer
i, seller A has expected payoff ΠA(wi) = wiQi + V (Ki −Qi, p, ψi) and outside option dA =
V (Ki, p, ψi) · I {c¯i ≤ p}+ [pQi + V (Ki −Qi, p, ψi)] · I {c¯i > p}, where I {·} is an indicator function.
In addition, we assume that c¯i ≥ cL > s for every i so that the bargaining always has a solution
(i.e., cL, the highest possible price a customer would like to pay, is higher than the marginal value
for the seller). Hence, we have the following lemma, which determines whether buyer i pays the
posted price or engages in price bargaining. Notice that βi and c¯i are known when the buyer arrives.
Lemma 1. If c¯i > p, buyer i pays the posted price; if c¯i ≤ p, Nash bargaining results in
wi = βi · V (Ki, p, ψi)− V (Ki −Qi, p, ψi)
Qi
+ (1− βi) · c¯i. (5)
Lemma 1 simply states that the chance of a buyer engaging in a price negotiation increases with
the posted price p. Hence, the higher the posted price, the more bargainers. It also states that the
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negotiated price is a function of the available capacity and transaction quantity. Based on Lemma
1, we know that as long as ∂V/∂K ≥ 0, our model satisfies the property that larger quantities
entail larger total payments.13 In order to understand how wi is affected by Ki and Qi, we need to
know more about value function V .
5.2 Source of Non-Monotonicity
In our model, we conjectured that a buyer’s bargaining power β and net switching cost c¯ are
not the source of price-quantity non-monotonicity and thus assumed for simplicity that they are
independent of purchase quantity Q. To verify our conjecture, we compare three different models
by running nonlinear regressions.
From Lemma 1 we can derive the discount received by buyer i for product j:
1− wij
pj
= I {cˆij < 1} · [1− βij · M vˆij − (1− βij) · cˆij ] , (6)
where M vˆij = [V (Kij , pj , ψij)− V (Kij −Qij , pj , ψij)] / (pjQij), and cˆij = c¯ij/pj . Now we see that
three factors can contribute to the non-monotonicity: cˆij , βij , and M vˆij . Hence, we consider three
different models. In preparation, we define φ (x) = a1 · (x−B)− + a2 · (x−B)2− + a3 · (x−B)+ +
a4 · (x−B)2+, which is the piece-wise polynomial function we used to capture the non-monotonicity
in the empirical analysis. In model (I), we assume that the non-monotonicity is rooted in how the
seller values capacity. In particular, cˆ = b′c · Xc, β = b′b · Xb, and M vˆ = φ (r4ds) + b′v · Xv. In
model (II), we assume that the non-monotonicity is due to the net switching cost. In particular,
cˆ = φ (r4ds) + b′c · Xc, β = b′b · Xb, and M vˆ = b′v · Xv. In model (III), we assume that the non-
monotonicity is driven by the quantity-dependent bargaining power. In particular, cˆ = b′c · Xc,
β = φ (r4ds) + b′b · Xb, and M vˆ = b′v · Xv. Note that although the three models have the same
components, they are different in structure. The other explanatory variables in the analysis are
as follows. We use lndod and 10 major brand names for Xc, Cshr and V rate for Xb, and Cbase,
lndod, CapL, and three quarters for Xv.
13It is easy to check that ∂ (wiQi) /∂Qi = βiV
′
K (Ki −Qi, p, ψi) + (1− βi) · c¯i.
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Table 9: Selected Regression Results for the Three Alternative Models
(I) (II) (III)
a1 -0.6508*** (0.2148) -0.2475* (0.1354) 1.0113** (0.4718)
a2 -1.0167** (0.4417) -0.3875 (0.3095) 1.1682 (0.9095)
a3 1.8758*** (0.5942) 0.4899 (0.3113) -1.5467 (1.5779)
a4 -8.7269*** (2.7016) -2.0765 (1.2606) 5.0896 (6.7346)
B 0.5865*** (0.0196) 0.5795*** (0.0397) 0.6297*** (0.0474)
R2 0.5140 0.4991 0.5117
d.f. 27 27 27
SS 50.6148 52.1636 50.8517
AICC -8945 -8874 -8934
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. SS: sum of squared errors.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
We run three nonlinear regressions based on the following equation:
EDij = I {cˆij < 1} · [1− βij · M vˆij − (1− βij) · cˆij ] + ˆij . (7)
The results are summarized in Table 9. Notice that the non-monotonicity is statistically signif-
icant only in model (I). In addition, given the same number of parameters or degrees of freedom
(d.f.), model (I) has the highest R2 and the lowest sum of squared residuals (SS). If we assume
that ˆ is normally distributed, we can use the corrected Akaike’s Information Criterion (AICC)
value (Akaike 1981) to compute the evidence ratio and compare the models.14 This shows us that
model (I) is 2.26 × 1015 times more likely to be correct compared with model (II) and 239 times
more likely compared with model (III). The evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of model (I) and
we conclude that model (I) is the best model among the three.
Other models can be derived by combining models (II) and (III). However, a serious collinearity
problem would exist if we let β depend on r4ds in (II) or let cˆ depend on r4ds in (III). Hence,
these models cannot provide better explanations. Lastly, when we add r4ds as a linear part of cˆ in
model (I), we find that the estimated coefficient is not significant. Thus it is reasonable to assume
that cˆ is not correlated with r4ds.
14The corrected AIC value is AICC = N · ln
(
SS
N
)
+ 2·J·N
N−J−1 , where N is the number of observations and J − 1 is
the number of parameters in the model. The evidence ratio, Pr{model (I) is correct}/Pr{model (II) is correct}, is
exp
[(
AIC
(II)
C −AIC(I)C
)
/2
]
.
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Figure 4: The Intuition Behind Proposition 1
6 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we first derive a sufficient condition on the value function for the price-quantity
curve to be non-monotonic. We then analyze the seller’s problem, formulate the value function,
and investigate its property. Finally, we show some examples of the price curve.
6.1 A Sufficient Condition for Non-Monotonicity
We assume V is a non-decreasing and twice-differentiable function of capacity K. To simplify the
notation, we write Vi (K) in place of V (K, p, ψi). We know the relationship between the price wi
and quantity Qi depends on the sign of the first-order derivative of wi in (5) with respect to Qi:
∂wi
∂Qi
=
βi
Qi
[
V ′i (K −Qi)−
Vi(K)− Vi (K −Qi)
Qi
]
. (8)
Given that βiQi > 0, the sign of
∂wi
∂Qi
depends on that of V ′i (K −Qi) − Vi(K)−Vi(K−Qi)Qi . A simple
examination leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If Vi (x) is concave for any x ∈ [0,K], then wi increases with Qi. If Vi (x) is
convex for any x ∈ [0,K], then wi decreases with Qi.
Although the above results are simple, they are surprising. Our initial intuition is that the value
function should be concave and the price should decrease with quantity. However, in order to observe
quantity discount, our simple model requires the value function to be convex. Figure 4 illustrates
the intuition behind Proposition 1. Note that given buyer i’s outside option and bargaining power,
wi depends on the seller’s average opportunity cost of selling Qi units. We see that as Qi increases,
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the average opportunity cost increases if the value function is concave and decreases if the value
function is convex. Based on this observation, we suspect that the value function cannot not be
simply convex or concave in order to observe a non-monotonic price-quantity relation. In fact, we
show that a value function that is a combination of convex and concave functions will generate a
non-monotonic price-quantity curve.
Proposition 2. If there exists x′ ∈ (0,K) such that Vi (x) is strictly convex for x ∈ [0, x′], strictly
concave for x ∈ [x′,K], and V ′i (0) < Vi(K)/K, then there exists x′′ ∈ (0,K) such that wi increases
with Qi for Qi ∈ [0,K − x′′] and decreases with Qi for Qi ∈ [K − x′′,K].
Proposition 2 provides us with a sufficient condition for the price-quantity relation to be non-
monotonic. We call this property convex-concave. We can infer from Figure 4 that when the
value function is convex-concave and the capacity level is high enough, the average cost of selling
Q units for the seller first increases and then decreases with Q, which leads to a non-monotonic
price-quantity relation.
It is reasonable to expect the value function to be convex-concave or S-shaped. When capacity
is very low, the seller is unlikely to fulfill any buyer’s need and will have to salvage. As capacity
increases, the likelihood of satisfying some buyers’ needs increases. When capacity is very high, it
may exceed demand and the seller may once again have to salvage a portion.
However, this result alone is not satisfactory, because it cannot explain the pricing pattern we
observe in the data. The preceding discussion was based on perturbing the purchase quantity of
a single buyer with a fixed-value function. If there are multiple buyers, the seller may update her
estimation of future demand based on the demand of the current buyer. Thus, the shape of the
value function may be different for buyers with different purchase quantities. In the following, we
extend our analysis by formulating and analyzing the value function.
6.2 Formulating the Value Function
Assume that K units of capacity is available after the (i− 1)-th buyer leaves. Let us consider the
value of this remaining capacity in four cases that constitute the sample space. First, the leftover
capacity may be salvaged with probability δi. Second, if buyer i arrives, the buyer walks away
immediately if the capacity is insufficient. Hence, if K < ηDi, the seller’s expected revenue at ti
is Vi (K). Third, if K ≥ ηDi and c¯i > p, the expected revenue is pQi + Vi (K −Qi). Fourth, if
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K ≥ ηDi and c¯i ≤ p, the expected revenue is (1− βi) c¯iQi+βi [Vi (K)− Vi (K −Qi)]+Vi (K −Qi).
Note that Qi = ρ
∗ (K, p,Di, βi, c¯i, ψi) ·Di can differ for different parameter values. As a result,
Vi−1 (K) = δi · s ·K + (1− δi) ·
{ˆ +∞
K/η
Vi (K) dF (D|ψi−1)
+
ˆ 1
0
ˆ K/η
0
ˆ +∞
p
[pρ∗D + Vi (K − ρ∗D)] dG (c¯|ψi−1) dF (D|ψi−1) dB (β|ψi−1)
+
ˆ 1
0
ˆ K/η
0
ˆ p
cL
[βVi (K) + (1− β)Vi (K − ρ∗D)] dG (c¯|ψi−1) dF (D|ψi−1) dB (β|ψi−1)
+
ˆ 1
0
ˆ K/η
0
ˆ p
cL
(1− β) c¯ρ∗DdG (c¯|ψi−1) dF (D|ψi−1) dB (β|ψi−1)
}
. (9)
Clearly, this is a complicated function and it is not obvious how Vi−1 (K) is affected by various
parameters. Hence, we try to derive approximations for the value function in two cases: one with
a finite buyer group and the other with a very large buyer group (i.e., M →∞).
6.3 An Approximation with Finite M
In this section, we derive an upper and a lower bound for Vi−1 (K) and we present the results in
Theorem 1. In preparation, we define
ν(p, ψM−1) = p− s−Eβ,c¯ [(p− (1− β)c¯− βs) · I {c¯ ≤ p} |ψM−1] . (10)
The key idea of the proof for the lower bound is the following. First, setting ρ = 1 in (9) leads to a
lower bound of Vi−1 (K). We then utilize the fact that the lower bound is a separable function of D
and we iteratively plug the lower bound into (9). We complete the proof by induction. The proof for
the upper bound is similar, except that we use ρ∗ ≤ 1. We have Eβ,c¯ [ν(p, ψi−1)|ψi−2] = ν(p, ψi−2)
and
´ +∞
0
´ λK
0 DdF (D|ψi−1) dF (D′|ψi−2) = E [E [D · I {D ≤ λK} |ψi−1] |ψi−2] =
´ λK
0 DdF (D|ψi−2).
Theorem 1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤M and K ≥ 0,
Vi−1 (K) ≥sK +
(
1− δli
)
· ν(p, ψi−1) ·
ˆ K·λM+1−i
0
DdF (D|ψi−1) , (11)
Vi−1 (K) ≤sK + (1− δui ) · ν(p, ψi−1) ·
ˆ K/η
0
DdF (D|ψi−1) , (12)
where δli = δi − (1− δi)
(
1− δli+1
)
F0 (K − λK), δui = δi − (1− δi)
(
1− δui+1
)
, and δuM = δ
l
M = δM .
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Because limK→+∞ F0 (K − λK) = 1, we have limK→+∞ δli = δui . Therefore, the upper and
lower bounds converge as K goes to infinity. Both the upper and lower bounds take a functional
form similar to VˆM−1 (K,λ), and it is reasonable to expect that Vi−1 (K) is similar to the bounds
as long as they are close enough. We may also conclude that the shape of the value function is
largely dependent on the demand distribution of the next buyer. However, the gap between the
upper and lower bounds increases with M . Hence, the bounds will perform well when M is not
very large. Otherwise, it may be useful to get bounds that are independent of M .
6.4 An Approximation with Infinite M
In this case, we assume that the buyer arrival rate is constantly λb. Hence, the probability of
ending the selling process is constant: δ = λ0λ0+λb . Before we analyze Vi−1 (K), note that we
can write it as E [R (K, {Dn, βn, c¯n, tn − tn−1}∞n=i) |ψi−1], where R is the total revenue, which is
a function of the future demand, buyer bargaining power, net marginal cost of buying outside,
and arrival times. Similarly, Vi (K) = E
[R (K, {Dn, βn, c¯n, tn − tn−1}∞n=i+1) |ψi]. Based on our
assumptions, {Dn, βn, c¯n, tn − tn−1}∞n=i and {Dn, βn, c¯n, tn − tn−1}∞n=i+1 are statistically equivalent
given information ψi−1. Thus, using this condition and the law of iterative expectation, we get
E [Vi (K) |ψi−1] = E
[R (K, {Dn, βn, c¯n, tn − tn−1}∞n=i+1) |ψi−1] = Vi−1 (K). Leveraging this prop-
erty of the value function, we obtain an upper bound and a lower bound for Vi−1 (K). In preparation,
let
Hi (K) = E [p− (p− (1− β)c¯) · I {c¯ ≤ p} |ψM−1] ·
ˆ K/η
0
DdF (D|ψi−1) , (13)
which is an approximate measure for the expected revenue obtained from the i-th buyer. Let
hi(K) = E
[
Vi
(
[K −Di]+
)
|ψi−1
]
/Vi−1 (K) . (14)
It is easy to see that hi(K) ∈ [0, 1]. Now we can introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For any i ≥ 1 and K ≥ 0, we have
s ·K + 1−δδ ·Hi (K)
1 + 1−δδ · [1− hi(K)] · (1−E [β|ψi−1] ·G(p|ψi−1))
≤ Vi−1 (K) ≤ s ·K + 1− δ
δ
·Hi (K) . (15)
If ∂∂KVi (K) ≥ s for any i ≥ 1, K ≥ 0, and ψi, then limK→∞ hi(K) = 1.
Let Ui−1 and Li−1 be the upper and lower bounds in (15), respectively. We have that Li−1 =
Ui−1/ (1 + Zi), where Zi = 1−δδ · [1− hi(K)] · (1−E [β|ψi−1] ·G(p|ψi−1)). We can see that the
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percentage gap, Ui−1−Li−1Ui−1 =
Zi
1+Zi
, goes to zero as K → ∞. The absolute gap, Ui−1 − Li−1 =
Zi
1+Zi
· Ui−1, also goes to zero if s = 0. When s > 0, the size of the absolute gap depends on
Zi · K. The result implies that the bounds will perform particularly well at the beginning of the
selling season, when the capacity is relatively large compared with the average buying quantity.
The gap is also decreasing in δ, E [β|ψi−1], and G(p|ψi−1). The bounds are closer to the true value
function when the leftover capacity is more likely to be salvaged, buyers are more powerful on
average, and buyers are more likely to engage in price bargaining. The condition ∂∂KVi (K) ≥ s
should be satisfied by definition because we assume that the seller can always salvage the capacity
at marginal value s. Thus, s should be the lowest marginal value for Vi (K).
6.5 Discussion
Note that Hi (K) can be written in the form of a
′ · ´K·a′′0 DdF (D|ψi−1), where a′ and a′′ are
parameters independent of K. Thus, the upper and lower bounds given by Theorem 1 and 2 can
all be written in the form of a · s ·K + a′ · ´K·a′′0 DdF (D|ψi−1), where a, a′, and a′′ are parameters
independent of K. Moreover, we learn from the proof of Theorem 1 that the value function of a
single-period problem takes a similar form. In essence we are approximating the value function
by a single-period problem in which the seller treats the next buyer as the last one. This is very
likely to be the mental heuristic used by a salesperson. More importantly, the approximations in
both cases suggest that the shape of the value function depends on the demand distribution of the
next buyer, which supports our conjecture in Section 6.1. We find that if the demand is normally
distributed, the bounds are all convex-concave.
Proposition 3. If the demand is normally distributed, then the bounds are all convex-concave.
Any other unimodal distribution may also generate S-shaped bounds, and it is quite natural to
expect a unimodal demand distribution. Therefore, the value function is very likely to be convex-
concave as described in Proposition 2 given that the bounds are tight enough.
6.6 Plotting the Price Curve
From (5) we know that the negotiated transaction price wi is a linear combination of both parties’
outside options. The seller’s outside option is the average opportunity cost of selling Qi, which
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depends on Qi, capacity Ki, and the value function. In this section, we first investigate the perfor-
mance and the shape of the bounds given a normal demand distribution and then try to plot the
price curve for different parameters.
Without loss of generality, we consider the seller negotiating with buyer i for quantity Qi at
time ti. As in the regression models, we control for capacity level, bargaining power, posted price,
and demand uncertainty, as well as all the other buyer-, product-, and market-related factors.
In the base case, we set K = 10, βi = 0.8, E [β|ψi] = βi, p = 8, s = 1, cL = 6, c¯i = 7,
G (c¯|ψi) = 1 − exp (cL − c¯), and η = 0.9. We assume that arrival rates satisfy λiλ0 = M−ii2 , which
means that the buyer arrival rate is linear in the number of potential buyers and the technology-
shock arrival rate increases quadratically in the number of buyers that have arrived. In addition,
we assume that the demand of the next buyer is normally distributed with mean µ and standard
deviation σ = µ · CV , where CV = 0.25 is a constant. After observing Qi, the seller updates belief
and set µ = min {12, 16− sm ×Qi} where sm captures the market structure, that is, larger sm
means more concentrated demand. This way of updating implies that if buyer i is very large, the
rest of the buyers are likely to be small, especially when the seller knows in advance the market
structure and the identities of the buyers. F0 is normal distribution with mean 12 and standard
deviation 12 · CV . Finally, we set hi(K) ≈ 1− s ·E [Di|ψi−1] /Vi−1 (K). See the proof of Theorem
2 for justifications.
In Figure 5, we present three numerical examples of the bounds for both finite and infinite M .
We can see that the bounds for finite M perform better with smaller M ; the performance of the
bounds for infinite M depends on the assumption of δ, and they work better with larger δ. In both
cases, the bounds are S-shaped given the normal demand distribution.
In Figure 6, we use the upper bounds in each case (of finite vs. infinite M) as the approximation
of the value function and generate the negotiated price for three different scenarios. With an S-
shaped value function, we obtain a price-quantity curve in all scenarios that is reversed-N-shaped,
which is consistent with our empirical observations.
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Figure 5: Illustrations of Bounds for the Value Function
Note. The three sets of lines illustrate the upper and lower bounds of Vi for different M and δ. In the case
of finite M : “+” for M − i = 3; “–” for M − i = 4; “•” for M − i = 5. In the case of infinite M : “+” for
δ = 0.2; “–” for δ = 0.3; “•” for δ = 0.4.
Figure 6: Model-Generated Price-Quantity Relation
Note. Case F-I: βi = 0.8; M = 3; sm = 0.9; CV = 0.2. Case I-I: βi = 0.8; δ = 0.4; sm = 0.9; CV = 0.2.
Case F-II: βi = 0.5; M = 3; sm = 1; CV = 0.25. Case I-II: βi = 0.5; δ = 0.4; sm = 1; CV = 0.25.
Case F-III: βi = 0.5; M = 5; sm = 1.1; CV = 0.3. Case I-III: βi = 0.5; δ = 0.6; sm = 1.1; CV = 0.3.
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7 Managerial Implications
According to our model, the reason some buyers are receiving lower discounts than those who
buy less is as follows: large buyers accelerate the selling process and small buyers are helpful
in consuming the residual capacity. However, satisfying mid-sized buyers may be costly because
supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity that may be too much
for small buyers but not enough for large buyers. This logic is reflected in the S-shaped value
function, as the seller’s marginal opportunity cost of selling to a buyer (or marginal loss of value)
increases the most with the purchase quantity when the remaining capacity gets close to the mean
demand of the next buyer. In this section, we begin by discussing the capacity allocation decision
for the seller given the non-monotonic price-quantity relation. Basically, the seller needs to avoid
mid-sized transactions by controlling the capacity allocation. Next, we discuss how the posted price
should be set given its influence on the selling process.
7.1 Dynamic Capacity Rationing
In this setting the seller should control the capacity that is allocated to each buyer while staying
in a range that is acceptable to the buyer. Given the complexity of the value function and the
price-quantity relation, it is not immediately clear whether the seller should increase or decrease
the allocated capacity. Based on our model, we derive a simple rule for deciding the quantity.
Proposition 4. The seller should increase ρi if ri > V
′
i (K −Qi) and decrease if ri < V ′i (K −Qi).
A rationing decision depends on the remaining capacity level, purchase quantity, demand dis-
tribution, and the buyer’s profit margin before subtracting the cost of this product. If we hold ri
constant, the allocated capacity should be reduced when K−Qi is close to the anticipated mean of
the demand from the next buyer; otherwise, the seller should sell as much as possible. This enables
the seller to reduce the likelihood of losing the next major buyer due to insufficient capacity. Due
to the shape of the value function, V ′i (K −Qi) is likely to be higher when K − Qi is neither too
high nor too low. On the other hand, if we hold V ′i (K −Qi) constant, then capacity reduction
is more likely to benefit the seller when the buyer has a lower profit margin. Clearly the seller
should reserve capacity for buyers who are willing to pay more. Overall, we can conclude that the
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allocation decisions cannot be based solely on capacity levels and purchase quantities of the current
buyer.
7.2 Posted-Price Optimization
When the posted price is determined, two important factors related to the selling process should
be considered. First, we learn from Lemma 1 that the posted price determines not only the price
a buyer pays but also the number of price-takers. A price that is too low undercuts the seller’s
profitability; a price that is too high encourages more buyers to engage in bargaining. Second, the
seller’s revenue is a function of both the posted price and the average discount received by bargain-
ers. Hence, incorrect anticipations of the average discount (or essentially the opportunity cost of
selling to each buyer) will lead to suboptimal posted prices. Our model can be used by sellers to
optimize the posted price while considering the price-taker-bargainer trade-off and a non-monotonic
price-quantity relationship with bargainers. The optimal posted price is p∗ = arg maxp V0 (κ, p).
Readers are referred to the electronic companion for details.
7.3 Implications for Other Industries
There are other industries that resemble the semiconductor industry. In the travel, airline, and hotel
industries, limited capacities have to be sold within a limited period. Customers in these industries
include bulk buyers such as travel agencies and resellers who also negotiate prices. Findings from our
study may carry over to these businesses. There are, however, a few important differences between
the semiconductor industry and the others. In the semiconductor industry, the obsolescence date is
stochastic while for the other industries it is deterministic. Also, purchase quantities may be subject
to negotiations in other industries. However, other industries may behave as if they have stochastic
obsolescence dates due to the uncertainty in the arrivals of buyers (i.e., the seller is not sure if
another buyer will come along before the capacity is salvaged). In addition, even if the quantity is
subject to negotiation, we may still observe a non-monotonic price-quantity relationship, because
selling mid-sized quantities remains costly for sellers given fixed capacities. Theoretically, Lemma 1
and Eq. (6) still hold even if both price and quantity are determined via Nash bargaining. Therefore,
the formulation of the value function as well as the subsequent analysis remains unchanged.
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8 Concluding Remarks
In this data-driven research, we studied the price-quantity relationship in a B2B market in which
the product life cycle is short and prices are set through one-shot negotiations. Using data from the
microprocessor market, we found that the price can be a non-monotonic function of the purchase
quantity. Contrary to our intuition, larger quantities can actually lead to higher prices. In partic-
ular, we observed an N-shaped discount curve in the data. In our empirical analysis we controlled
for a number of factors that offer competing explanations for our observation. We also showed that
some of the omitted variables do not alter the key observation.
We developed and analyzed a stylized model to delve into this phenomenon to understand the
underlying rationale. Our analysis reveals that it is fairly plausible for the price-quantity relation
to be non-monotonic. If the value of residual capacity is convex-concave we can then observe
a non-monotonic price-quantity curve. Although we normally assume that the value function is
increasing and concave, our model shows that this is not necessarily true in B2B markets. Instead,
if the demand is normally distributed, the value function is likely to be convex-concave. More
importantly, we found that a convex-concave value function is enough to explain our empirical
observation, that is, an N-shaped discount curve.
There are many limitations to our work. Our analysis assumes a static Nash bargaining model
with fixed capacity. Future research may obtain different price-quantity relations by considering
dynamic strategic bargaining and capacity levels that diminish with time. Also it was impossible
for us to consider and eliminate all other explanations for the N-shaped curve. It is possible that
certain behavioral biases may also result in this pricing pattern. We sincerely hope that our work
stimulates additional theoretical and empirical research.
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